Moles vs. IAC
In April 1977, petitioner entered into an oral contract of sale of a printing machine for his printing business from private respondent Diolosa. To facilitate a loan application with the DBP for the payment of the said equipment, a pro forma invoice reflecting the amount of Php 50,000 as consideration of the sale was signed by petitioner. By the end of the same month, the equipment was delivered to petitioner’s publishing house where it was installed by an employee of the respondent. In August 1977, private respondent issued a certification wherein he warranted that the machine sold was in A-1 condition, together with other express warranties.
In November 1977, petitioner informed private respondent of the machine’s malfunction but the latter did not reply. It was only in March 1978 that private respondent sent two employees to fix the machine but to no avail. An expert witness for petitioner declared that the linotype machine was too defective and repairs will be very costly.
Hence, petitioner filed for the rescission of the contract with damages. Respondents answer questioned the issue of jurisdiction of the case.
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for
When an article is sold as a secondhand item, a question arises as to whether there is an implied warranty of its quality or fitness. It is generally held that in the sale of a designated and specific article sold as secondhand, there is no implied warranty as to its quality or fitness for the purpose intended, at least where it is subject to inspection at the time of the sale. On the other hand, there is also authority to the effect that in a sale of a secondhand articles there may be, under some circumstances, an implied warranty of fitness for the ordinary purpose of the article sold or for the particular purpose of the buyer.
In the instant case, a certification to the effect that the linotype machine bought by petitioner was in A-1 condition was issued by private respondent in favor of the former. This cannot but be considered as an express warranty. However, it is private respondent’s submission that the same is not binding on him, not being a part of the contract of sale between them. This contention is bereft of substance.
It must be remembered that the certification was a condition sine qua non for the release of petitioner’s loan which was to be used as payment for the purchase price of the machine. Private respondent failed to refute this material fact. Neither does he explain why he made that express warranty on the condition of the machine if he had not intended to be bound by it.
We disagree with respondent court that private respondents express warranty as to the A-1 condition of the machine was merely dealer’s talk. Private respondent was not a dealer of printing or linotype machines to whom could be ascribed the supposed resort to the usual exaggerations of trade in said items. His certification as to the condition of the machine was not made to induce petitioner to purchase it but to confirm in writing for purposes of the financing aspect of the transaction his representations thereon. Ordinarily, what does not appear on the face of the written instrument should be regarded as dealer’s or trader’s talk; 25 conversely, what is specifically represented as true in said document, as in the instant case, cannot be considered as mere dealer’s talk.
At a belated stage of this appeal, private respondent came up for the first time with the contention that the action for rescission is barred by prescription. While it is true that Article 1571 of the Civil Code provides for a prescriptive period of six months for a redhibitory action a cursory reading of the ten preceding articles to which it refers will reveal that said rule may be applied only in case of implied warranties. The present case involves one with and express warranty. Consequently, the general rule on rescission of contract, which is four years shall apply